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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
What form should an optimal contract take to handle the prospect of wrong-
ful penalties? Our answer is that standard debt contracts are often optimal.
In other words, a theory of debt is proposed based on inaccurate auditing in
a costly state verification framework.
As we detail presently, costly state verification environments imply that
equity contracts are optimal. However, that conclusion is shown to rest
crucially on the efficacy of the audit technology. We introduce wrongful
penalties through an imperfect audit technology.1 With perfect auditing,
optimal contracts can economize on audit costs ex post by committing to
sufficiently severe penalties ex ante. Consequently, deterministic auditing
is not optimal. Moreover, enjoying access to a perfect audit technology,
agents may write contracts which pass on small fluctuations in revenue to
security holders. However, a key insight under imperfect auditing is that the
prospect of disputes and wrongful penalties restricts acceptable contracts to
using smaller penalties than would otherwise be the case.2 Smaller penalties
come at the cost of encouraging fraudulent reports for any given repayment
schedule. So, whilst increasing the frequency of audits can help with risk
sharing, it also implies levying more wrongful penalties.
It turns out that the marginal gain to auditing low reports is positive
even as the probablility of audits approaches unity.3 To see why auditing
is often efficient despite its cost and inaccuracy, note that borrowers who
suffer poor returns (‘low types’) and who are not audited will have lower
consumption allocations than otherwise as they are indistinguishable from
1Our results carry over to other situations where the lender or bankruptcy court might
erroneously dispute the borrower’s revenue report.
2Our model is static, and our penalties are just units of the consumption good, but this
reasoning carries over to alternative settings where alternative enforcement schemes such
as non-pecuniary penalties or exclusion may be applied. When disputes are possible, even
honest borrowers prefer the penalties for dishonesty to be smaller, all else equal.
3Note that an exogenous restriction to penalties does not have the same effect as audit
errors. When there are audit errors, agents always prefer penalties to be lower, all else
equal. When penalties are exogenously limited, there is no desire for them to be lower than
the exogenous limit. As long as exogenous limits to penalties are not trivial, stochastic
audit regimes are optimal under perfect audits.
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high types. And whilst their consumption is not as low as the entrepreneurs
who suffer errors (i.e., Type-I errors), it is still somewhat lower than low
types whose reports are verified. Hence, whilst fewer entrepreneurs suffer
errors when audits are stochastic, fewer also have their reports verified. That
benefit from auditing outweighs the cost.4
On the other hand, attempting to pass on small fluctuations in revenue
would require a high probability of audit but would entail the possibility
of an error or dispute. At some point, it might no longer be worthwhile to
attempt to pass on these risks: It may be better just to pay the principal plus
interest.
The upshot is that we find that the optimal external finance contract often
combines deterministic audits following low revenue reports with no audits
for revenue reports above a certain cutoff. Following most reports, the bor-
rower’s repayment is independent of marginal differences in revenue: the
borrower simply repays the principal plus interest. Moreover, when errors
are rare, the optimal repayment following an overturned income report is
just equal to the contracted coupon plus principal of the loan. Such features
resemble standard debt contracts.5,6 The key results are contained largely in
Theorem 2 and Proposition 3 below.
4There is, however, an additional benefit from stochastic audits since the higher leverage
that accompanies it implies high types enjoy higher consumption. In general, as we show
below, that consideration does not outweigh the benefits from an always-audit contract.
5Earlier contributions to CSV problems with audit errors have focused on insurance
problems in the context of a risky endowment. Haubrich (1995) shows that weakly in-
formative audits are rarely used in efficient contracts. Alary and Gollier (2004) study an
example with no commitment to audits, showing that the occurence of strategic default
is dependent on the preferences of the agent. Imperfect signals are also commonly em-
ployed in the law enforcement literature. See Polinsky and Shavell (2007) for an excellent
summary.
6A different literature assumes that project outcomes are observable, yet entrepreneurial
actions are partially observable. Efficient contracts must encourage entrepreneurs to exert
privately costly effort. In these models, the concepts of debt and equity finance are related
solely to the optimal sensitivity of repayments to project outcomes. A recent example
which rationalises a combination of debt and equity in this setting with partially observable
actions and limited enforceability is Ellingsen and Kristiansen (2011).
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0.1 DETERMINISTIC INCENTIVE REGIMES AND LEVER-
AGE
Introducing imperfect audits encourages both deterministic audit regimes,
when risk sharing is considered to be of high value, and also the complete
removal of audits, when risk sharing is considered to be of low value. The
interaction between leverage and costly, imperfect auditing underpins the
finding that deterministic incentive schemes are generally optimal. Note that
leverage and audit probability are similar in that higher leverage increases
expected consumption and the spread of consumption outturns; so too does
a decrease in audit probabilities. So, for low levels of borrowing and hence
low levels of risk, audits are less desirable. However, if borrowing is very
high there will be a large impact on consumption if a low return is mistaken
for a high return, what we call a type-I error. That implies that there is
an endogenous borrowing limit and that the audit probability goes to zero
as borrowing approaches that limit. For intermediate levels of borrowing
equilibrium auditing is typically deterministic; that is, of probability one.
That non-monotonic relationship between audit probabilities and lever-
age is perhaps surprising. However, more surprising is what we label a
bang-bang result: Efficient contracts can jump from being non-contingent
to standard debt contracts with deterministic auditing in low states, in re-
sponse to marginal increases in project risk. Moreover, there is a discon-
tinuous decrease in optimal leverage, an increase in default, an increase in
expected monitoring costs and a drop in average consumption. We are able
to characterize analytically the trade-offs that occur at the point when op-
timal contracts change in that way. At that point, there are two contracts
which deliver the same level of utility; one a high-leverage/never-audit con-
tract, the other a low-leverage/standard debt contract.
Audit costs also play an important role in determining optimal leverage.
When audit costs are low, optimal leverage is such as to permit large gains
from insurance or auditing. In that case, ‘extreme’ incentive regimes tend
to be optimal and auditing strategies are, again, deterministic; specifically,
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always audit contracts are optimal.7
Interior solutions for audit probability are possible but these are some-
what unusual in our set-up because they require very high audit costs in
addition to high project risk.
1 LITERATURE
Equity finance typically allows issuers to reduce repayments or dividends
in bad times whilst reductions in the value of assets are shared between
borrowers and lenders. Debt finance is more rigid. Debts are only reduced
or discharged in bankruptcy, which follows large falls in income or asset
values. So, surely it would be better if there was less debt and more equity?
Townsend (1979) was first to propose an explanation for the prevalence
of debt contracts. He shows that when a risk averse borrower’s income is
costly to verify a standard debt contract is superior either to a strict debt
contract, where repayments are constant across states, or a standard equity
contract, where repayments are proportional to the borrower’s income. The
difficulty with the equity contract is that to ensure the borrower does not
misreport income the investor needs to undertake a costly audit regardless
of the report. A superior contract prescribes audits and risk sharing only
following sufficiently low reports, when the borrower’s marginal utility and
sensitivity to risk are highest. If the borrower’s income is sufficiently high,
they make a fixed repayment and absorb any remaining income risk at the
margin. Such a contract is the standard debt contract that is widespread in
personal and corporate loan markets.
Townsend’s analysis constrained agents to deterministic auditing regimes.
However, he suggested a better contract might employ a stochastic auditing
schedule. Perhaps following a very low report an audit would be highly
7Gale and Hellwig (1985) also study the effects of audit costs and risk aversion on lever-
age in a costly state verification model with perfect and deterministic audits. Our analysis
permits stochastic audit regimes, and finds alternative interactions between leverage and
the contracting environment: leverage has a dramatic impact on the nature of the efficient
contract in our model, and it is the joint determination of leverage and incentive regime
which encourages debt contracts in our framework.
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likely, and following a high report less so. Using stochastic auditing schemes
would allow more risk sharing across states with fewer resources spent on
audits across a portfolio of loans. Border and Sobel (1987) and Mookherjee
and Png (1989) confirm Townsend’s conjecture. In fact, they show that de-
terministic audit strategies are never constrained efficient: Audit strategies
should be stochastic, and the probability of audit should be positive even
following relatively high revenue reports. Such a contract looks more like
equity in the sense that income need not be low before the contract specifies
risk sharing.
That risk sharing comes at a cost. A cost that is not captured in the
benchmark model. In order to ensure truth-telling when the probability of
audit is low, audits that contradict the borrower’s report can result in penal-
ties far larger than the amount borrowed. If that audit technology were to
contradict a truthful report, then the prospect of sizeable, wrongful penal-
ties might render such contracts unacceptable to the borrower. Indeed, even
if the entrepreneur were merely to fear that audits may not be perfect, or
that their truthful report may be disputed by the lender or bankruptcy court,
they would likely baulk at a contract that leaves open the prospect of large
penalties following disputed reports. In short, equity-like contracts provide
more insurance across states, but may exacerbate already bad situations for
a borrower. Hence the motivation of this paper.
1.1 COMMITMENT
This paper, along with the aforementioned studies, considers an environ-
ment where the lender is able to commit ex ante to an incentive regime
which is wasteful ex post. That commitment may indicate a concern for
reputation, or delegation to a specialised auditor or bankruptcy court as in
Melumad and Mookherjee (1989). Krasa and Villamil (2000) investigate
what happens when lenders cannot commit to costly audits. That lack of
commitment means the revelation principle does not hold and in equilib-
rium borrowers misreport their income with positive probability. It turns
out that lack of commitment means that determinstic audits may be a fea-
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ture of the optimal contract. Audits can only occur if the expected value of
penalties levied following audits exceeds the audit costs. If true for a par-
ticular reported income, then this report will be audited with certainty. In
short, for Krasa and Villamil (2000) the ability to commit implies equity-
like contracts are preferable, whereas for us it does not.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 1 lays out the model
environment and the nature of the auditing technology. Section 2 charac-
terizes some key features of efficient contracts. In section 3 we present the
perfect audits benchmark. Section 4 explores the imperfect audits case, and
contains the key contributions of the paper. Section 5 presents comparative
statics for a special case of the model where closed form solutions can be
obtained. Section 6 provides a numerical example of a four state version of
the model. Efficient contracts under perfect and imperfect audits are com-
pared. Section 7 offers concluding remarks. Appendices contain formal
arguments and proofs. Figures are contained in Appendix E.
2 THE ENVIRONMENT
We study the one period problem of a risk averse and credit constrained
entrepreneur. The entrepreneur has access to a special technology offering
high returns which are uncorrelated with other projects undertaken in the
economy.
The outcome of the project is initially private information to the en-
trepreneur, limiting the sharing of risk between the entrepreneur and their
financier (the financial intermediary). Contract repayments are enforceable,
but can only be conditioned on public information. The public informa-
tion available to condition contracts includes any message sent by the en-
trepreneur, and any audit signal produced by the audit technology.
The entrepreneur makes a take-it-or-leave it contract offer to the finan-
cial intermediary, who is well-diversified and perfectly competitive. An
efficient contract maximises the entrepreneur’s expected utility.
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2.1 THE ENTREPRENEUR
The entrepreneur enjoys consumption at the end of the period according to
U(x), where U ′,−U ′′ > 0, and U ′(0) =∞. The entrepreneur brings wealth
α of the consumption good into the period. Combining the entrepreneur’s
wealth α with the net funds borrowed from the financial intermediary b, the
project produces the consumption good according to stochastic gross return
(α + b)θ. In this section, we restrict revenue to be drawn from one of two
states, θ ∈ Θ, Θ = {θ¯, θ} and θ¯ > θ. This restriction assists the intuition
behind our key results, but is not essential for them. Section 6 extends the
model to a four-state version, exploring optimal risk sharing across states in
the perfect and imperfect audit models.
Following the realisation of their project, the entrepreneur can send a
public signal indicating the state and subsequent revenues of the project.
Messages m are drawn from M = {m¯,m}, where a message of m¯ corre-
sponds to reporting that the entrepreneur has received a high type shock θ¯,
and a report of m implies a low type shock, θ.
2.2 THE FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY
There exists a well-diversified financial intermediary who can make credible
commitments to future actions.8 Any contract involving the entrepreneur
and the financial intermediary is small from the perspective of the financial
intermediary’s balance sheet. Further, the entrepreneur’s return shock θ is
uncorrelated with other shocks in the economy, and the returns of other
assets/liabilities of the financial intermediary’s balance sheet. It follows that
the financial intermediary is risk neutral with respect to claims contingent
on the entrepreneur’s return shock θ.
The financial intermediary operates in a perfectly competitive market.
Their opportunity cost of funds is given by ρ, and any contract offering an
expected return on possibly state contingent loans exceeding ρ is acceptable
8Efficient contracts will require commitment on behalf of the financial intermediary.
One might think of this as sustained either through the intermediary’s concern for its repu-
tation, or through delegation to a specialist bailiff or auditor as in Melumad and Mookherjee
(1989).
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to the financial intermediary. This condition is formalised in Definition 5.
The opportunity cost of funds could be thought of as some combination
of the interest rate paid by a risk free bond, the interest rate paid by the
intermediary to their deposit holders, and the intermediary’s administrative
costs.
The following two assumptions ensure that there are available positive
(but finite) gains from trade between the entrepreneur and financial interme-
diary.
Assumption 1 Expected project returns exceed the financial intermediary’s
opportunity cost of funds,
∑
θ∈Θ pi(θ)θ > ρ.
Assumption 2 In the low state, project returns are lower than the financial
intermediary’s opportunity cost of funds, θ < ρ.
Assumption 1 ensures that there are economic gains from diverting re-
sources to the entrepreneur’s project, even when the entrepreneur has access
to a deposit facility at the bank yielding a risk free return equal to the bank’s
opportunity cost of funds, ρ. Assumption 1 is strong enough to ensure that
b > −α.
Assumption 2 specifies that the entrepreneurs’ projects are risky. In bad
states, a project will yield lower returns than the risk free asset. Assump-
tion 2 will be sufficient to ensure that leverage is finite under efficient con-
tracts when type-I audit errors are present, a result shown in Proposition 3.
2.3 AUDITS
There exists an audit technology which produces a signal σ ∈ Σ providing
information about the outcome of the entrepreneur’s project ex post. The
action to undertake an audit is common knowledge, and so is the signal pro-
vided, σ. In other words, the entrepreneur knows if (s)he has been audited,
and the result of the audit. It is assumed that an audit strategy, contingent
on the entrepreneur’s reports, can be agreed and committed to ex ante.
The audit technology cost is linear in assets, κ(α+ b), where κ is a fixed
parameter. The signal produced by the audit technology maps from the
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space of realised shocks θ as follows: If there is no audit, the audit signal
is the empty set, σ = ∅. If there is an audit and the true state is θ¯, the audit
technology reports σ(θ¯) = σ¯ with probability (1 − η(θ¯)), and σ(θ¯) = σ
with probability η(θ¯). If there is an audit and the true state is θ, the audit
technology reports σ(θ) = σ with probability (1−η(θ)), and σ(θ) = σ¯ with
probability η(θ).
Assumption 3 Audits are informative: η(θ¯) + η(θ) < 1.
Definition 1 Conditional upon an audit, a Type-I error occurs when the
audit technology signals a high type return when the true return is low,
σ(θ) = σ¯. A Type-II error occurs when the audit technology signals a low
type return when the true return is high, σ(θ¯) = σ.
Audit strategies are defined in contracts, and implemented ex post by the
financial intermediary. An audit strategy specifies the probability of audit,
conditional upon the message sent by the entrepreneur, q(m).
3 CONTRACTS
Definition 2 A contract is an ordered set Γ = (b, q(m), z(m,σ), x(m,σ, θ))
where b, q(m) are publicly observed actions; z(m,σ) : Θ × Σ → R is a
function mapping publicly observed information to the financial interme-
diary’s ex post receipt from the entrepreneur; and the entrepreneur’s con-
sumption allocations are specified by x(m,σ, θ) : M × Σ×Θ→ R+.
A key motivation for this paper is the search for environments where
debt contracts are efficient.
Definition 3 We specify the following two benchmark contracts.
a. A non-contingent debt contract is a contract with constant repayments
across all states and messages z(mi, σj) = z(mk, σl) ∀mi,mk ∈
M, σj, σl ∈ Σ. Any available audit signals are ignored, and there-
fore no audits are conducted (q(m) = 0).
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b. A standard debt contract specifies a constant repayment when either
the entrepreneur’s message or the audit signal is high, and a lower
repayment following a verified low report (z(m¯, ∅) = z(m, σ¯) >
z(m,σ)). All low reports are audited (q(m) = 1).
Note that debt contracts in our model do not restrict the entrepreneur bor-
rower to zero consumption following default. In fact, in the examples that
we consider, entrepreneurs will enjoy strictly positive consumption in all
circumstances, even following a default. This positive consumption could
represent income already paid to the entrepreneur during the life of the
project, or rights to future earned income after the discharging of debts in
bankruptcy.
Budget Constraints State contingent budget constraints are specified as
follows:
(α+ b)θ = z(m,σ) + x(m,σ, θ) ∀(m,σ, θ) ∈M × Σ×Θ. (1)
The left hand side is the revenue received by the entrepreneur from their
project, denominated in the consumption good. Following the repayment z,
the remainder available for the entrepreneur to consume is x.
Definition 4 A contract is incentive compatible if and only if m∗(θ) =
m,m∗(θ¯) = m¯ solves the following problem:
m∗(θ) ∈ arg max
m(θ)
(1− q(m(θ)))U(x(m(θ), ∅, θ)) + q(m(θ))[1− η(θ)]U(x(m(θ), σ = θ, θ))
+ q(m(θ))η(θ)U(x(m(θ), σ 6= θ, θ)), θ ∈ {θ, θ¯} (2)
The consumption allocations on the right hand side of equation 2 are
bundles enjoyed by misreporting agents. We can re-write the incentive
compatibility constraint with respect to bundles consumed in truth-telling
contracts by substituting in the budget constraints (1):
m∗(θ) ∈ arg max
m(θ)
(1− q(m(θ)))U(x(m(θ), ∅, θ))
+ q(m(θ))[1− η(θ)]U [x(m(θ), σ = θ,m(θ)) + (α+ b)(θ −m(θ))]
+ q(m(θ))η(θ)U [x(m(θ), σ 6= θ,m(θ)) + (α+ b)(θ −m(θ))], θ ∈ {θ, θ¯}
(3)
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Definition 5 A contract is acceptable to the financial intermediary if and
only if
∑
m∈Θ
∆(m)
[ ∑
σ∈Θ∪∅
∆(σ|m, q(m))z(m,σ)− q(m)(α + b)κ
]
≥ bρ, (4)
where ∆(·) is an operator generating unconditional probability measures
over its arguments. The state of nature θ is unobservable to the financial
intermediary, therefore expectations in (4) are formed over the probability
measure constructed over the entrepreneur’s possible reports, which com-
bines the likelihoods of shocks θ with the entrepreneur’s ex post best re-
sponse reporting strategy.
Definition 6 A contract is feasible if and only if it is acceptable, and satis-
fies the budget constraints.
Definition 7 An incentive compatible contract is efficient if and only if it
maximises the entrepreneur’s utility subject to feasibility
max
Γ
∑
θ∈Θ
pi(θ)
∑
σ∈Σ∪∅
∆(σ|m, q(m))U(x(m,σ, θ)) (5)
subject to
(1), (2), (4), q(m) ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 1 In any efficient contract:
1. The financial intermediary’s participation constraint (4) is binding,
2. high type reports are never audited, q(m¯) = 0, and
3. the downward incentive compatibility constraint (equation 2, where
θ = θ¯) is binding when either (a) Type-I audit errors occur (η(θ) >
0), or (b) utility is bounded below (U(0) = 0).
A short description of the proposition follows, while Appendix A pro-
vides formal perturbation arguments for parts 2 and 3.
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For part 1, note that if the intermediary’s participation constraint were
slack, repayments following high type reports z(m¯, ∅) could be reduced.
That would increase the expected utility of the entrepreneur without breach-
ing the incentive compatibility constraint.
The intuition for part 2 is as follows: Let it be the case that audits are
required to prevent low type agents from declaring high type reports. Such
a contract must be increasing rather than reducing consumption risk relative
to some strictly superior non-contingent contract.
Proposition 1 part 3 shows that if high type entrepreneurs strictly prefer
to report truthfully their income, then it must be the case that either high
type consumption could be transferred to low states, or the auditing proba-
bility and expense could be reduced, allowing a direct increase in expected
utility, or relaxing the participation constraint respectively. Note that the
proof provided for Proposition 1 part 3(a) does not require the entrepreneur
to freely choose the audit probability q. When audit signals are imperfect,
the incentive compatibility constraint is binding even when all low reports
are audited.
Corollary 1 Let the audit probability q be constrained arbitrarily. Subject
to this constraint, the downward incentive compatibility constraint (equa-
tion 2, where θ = θ¯) is binding for any efficient contract when Type-I audit
errors occur (η(θ) > 0).
We can now re-write the problem as a Kuhn-Tucker problem:
L = p¯i U(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯)) + pi(1− q(m)) U(x(m, ∅, θ))
+ piq(m)(1− η(θ)) U(x(m,σ, θ)) + piq(m)η(θ) U(x(m, σ¯, θ))
+ λ
[
(α+ b)(E(θ)− ρ− piq(m)κ) + αρ− p¯ix(m¯, ∅, θ¯)− pi(1− q(m))x(m, ∅, θ)
−piq(m)(1− η(θ))x(m,σ, θ)− piq(m)η(θ)x(m, σ¯, θ)
]
+ µ
 U(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯))− (1− q(m))U [x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]−q(m)(1− η(θ¯))U [x(m, σ¯, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]
−q(m)η(θ¯)U [x(m,σ, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]

+ ν0q(m) + ν1(1− q(m)). (6)
The Lagrange multipliers λ and µ are attached respectively to the partici-
pation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint, and the Kuhn-
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Tucker multipliers, ν0 and ν1, to the upper and lower bounds on the proba-
bility of audit respectively. Proposition 1 ensures that the participation and
incentive compatibility constraints are binding under any efficient contract.
The upper and lower bounds on the audit probability q(m) are occasionally
binding constraints.
The first order necessary conditions are described in detail as they will
be used at various points to establish certain facts about efficient contracts.
Hence:
x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) : 0 = p¯i U ′(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯))− λp¯i + µU ′(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯)) (6a)
x(m, ∅, θ) : 0 = pi(1− q(m)) U ′(x(m, ∅, θ))− λpi(1− q(m))
− µ(1− q(m))U ′[x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)] (6b)
x(m,σ, θ) : 0 = piq(m)(1− η(θ)) U ′(x(m,σ, θ))− λpiq(m)(1− η(θ))
− µq(m)η(θ¯)U ′[x(m,σ, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)] (6c)
x(m, σ¯, θ) : 0 = piq(m)η(θ) U ′(x(m, σ¯, θ))− λpiq(m)η(θ)
− µq(m)(1− η(θ¯))U ′[x(m, σ¯, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)] (6d)
b : 0 = λ(E(θ)− ρ− piqκ)
− µ(θ¯ − θ)
 (1− q(m))U
′[x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]
+q(m)(1− η(θ¯))U ′[x(m, σ¯, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]
+q(m)η(θ¯)U ′[x(m,σ, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]
 (6e)
q(m) : 0 = −pi U(x(m, ∅, θ)) + pi(1− η(θ)) U(x(m,σ, θ)) + piη(θ) U(x(m, σ¯, θ))
+ λ [pix(m, ∅, θ)− pi(1− η(θ))x(m,σ, θ)− piη(θ)x(m, σ¯, θ)]
+ µ
 +U [x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]−(1− η(θ¯))U [x(m, σ¯, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]
−η(θ¯)U [x(m,σ, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]

− λ(α+ b)piκ+ ν0 − ν1. (6f)
The general problem is non-convex, owing to the uncertainty faced by
misreporting high type agents. Numerical results in the following sections
indeed confirm that multiple locally efficient contracts may result.
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4 PERFECT AUDITS
In the introduction we stated that the interaction between leverage and costly,
imperfect audits underpins the optimality of deterministic contracts. Before
establishing that, and other, results it is insightful to analyse the case of
perfect audits. We find, as did Mookherjee and Png (1989), that debt con-
tracts are not optimal. Moreover, we go on to show that optimal leverage is
unbounded, absent other restrictions.
Theorem 1 (Mookherjee and Png (1989)) When audits yield correct sig-
nals with certainty (η(θ) = η(θ¯) = 0), standard debt contracts are ineffi-
cient, q∗(m) 6= 1.
The proof proceeds as follows. First, Lemma 1 shows that when audits
are perfect, any allocation which is feasible under a standard debt contract
can be achieved while the incentive compatibility constraint is slack. Then,
Proposition 1 part 3 shows that the downward incentive compatibility con-
straint cannot be slack under any efficient contract. Therefore, all alloca-
tions which are feasible under a standard debt contract are inefficient.
Lemma 1 Let audits yield correct signals with certainty (η(θ) = η(θ¯) = 0),
consumption be positive in all states x(·) > 0, and the probability of audit
of low type reports be equal to 1, q(m) = 1. Any feasible allocation can be
implemented with the incentive compatibility constraint slack.
Proof. To prove Lemma 1, first re-write the downward incentive com-
patibility constraint (equation 2, where θ = θ¯), with q = 1 as follows:
U(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) ≥ U [(α + b)θ¯ − z(m, σ¯)]. Under perfect audits, the observ-
able pair (m, σ¯) correctly identifies misreporting high type entrepreneurs
with certainty. Under a truth-telling equilibrium, the repayment z(m, σ¯) is
not made by any agent. Any feasible allocation can be perturbed by increas-
ing z(m, σ¯), which does not affect the participation constraint of the finan-
cial intermediary, does not affect the ex ante welfare of the entrepreneur, but
does ensure that the incentive compatibility constraint is slack.
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Proposition 2 When audits are perfect (η(θ) = η(θ¯) = 0), sufficiently in-
expensive (κ < (E(θ)− ρ)/pi) and projects enjoy constant returns to scale,
efficient leverage and entrepreneurial consumption are infinite.
Proof. Set the probability of audit equal to one, q = 1. Substituting the
budget constraints (1) into the participation constraint (4) shows that when
κ < (E(θ)−ρ)/pi, expected consumption will be rising in b. Lemma 1 states
that the incentive compatibility constraint need not bind for any allocation
satisfying the participation constraint, given any level of borrowing b.
Under perfect audits, auditing with a high probability allows us to equate
the entrepreneur’s ex post marginal utility across all states, regardless of
leverage. When audits are sufficiently inexpensive, higher leverage permits
higher entrepreneurial consumption in all states. Leverage in equilibrium
is only bound by decreasing technological returns to scale, as in Gale and
Hellwig (1985), or through general equilibrium effects.
If the probability of audit is sufficiently high, large penalties charged
against misreporting high type entrepreneurs ensure that the incentive com-
patibility constraint is slack for any schedule of positive consumption allo-
cations earned with positive probability. Any further audits would be waste-
ful, as the resource costs of additional audits would tighten the participation
constraint of the fiinancial intermediary, and as the incentive compatibility
constraint was already slack, no further risk sharing gains would be avail-
able from the additional audits.
Efficient allocations require that any agent who earns a low type return,
declares their return truthfully, yet receives a high type audit signal (m, σ¯, θ)
should face a repayment greater than their revenue z(m, σ¯) > (α + b)θ.
However, this outcome occurs with zero probability when audits are perfect.
5 IMPERFECT AUDITS
When type-I errors occur with positive probability (η(θ) > 0), Lemma 1
and subsequently Theorem 1 cease to hold; the outcome (m, σ¯, θ) occurs
with positive probability in any contract with auditing (q∗(m) > 0). Even
15
if the audit probability is high, a further increase in the audit probability
does increase the set of feasible consumption allocations available to the
entrepreneur. Increasing the probability of audit under imperfect audits al-
lows the incentive costs of contract enforcement to be defrayed more widely,
increasing risk sharing across states. If audit costs are low, then increasing
the probability of audit is worthwhile even when the probability of audit is
already high.
Theorem 2 Let borrowing be taken as given b = bˆ. When type-I audit er-
rors occur with positive probability (η(θ) > 0), there exists some strictly
positive audit cost κˆ such that for all κ < κˆ, standard debt contracts
(q(m) = 1) are efficient.
Proof. We consider an arbitrary efficient contract with interior audit prob-
ability q(m) ∈ (0, 1), and show from the first order condition for the prob-
ability of audit Lq(m) that if audit costs were sufficiently low, the initial
contract could be strictly improved by an increase in audit probability q(m).
To simplify notation, in this section we will define B(b) := (α+ b)(θ¯−
θ). Also, as we are only considering allocations consistent with truth-telling,
we will drop the report variable from the consumption allocation x(σ, θ) :=
x(m,σ, θ).
Consider the first order necessary condition for q(m) (6f), which can be
re-written as follows:
Lq(m) : 0 = pi(1− η(θ)) [U(x(σ, θ))− λx(σ, θ)]− µη(θ¯)U [x(σ, θ) +B(b)]
+ piη(θ) [U(x(σ¯, θ))− λx(σ¯, θ)]− µ(1− η(θ¯))U [x(σ¯, θ) +B(b)]
− pi [U(x(∅, θ)) + λx(∅, θ)] + µ U [x(∅, θ) +B(b)]
− λ(α+ b)piκ+ ν0 − ν1. (7)
Up to division by q(m), the consumption variables x(σ, θ), x(σ¯, θ) enter
Lq(m) in the same way that they enter the entrepreneur’s problem L (equa-
tion 6). This means that the first order necessary conditions for x(σ, θ), x(σ¯, θ)
(equations 6c and 6d respectively), also identify a stationary point of Lq(m),
with respect to the consumption allocations of audited agents (x(σ, θ), x(σ¯, θ))
and holding other variables constant.
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This property has a straightforward economic interpretation: efficiently
allocating consumption to audited agents, is the same problem as maximis-
ing the gain from additional audits, which is expressed by the first order
condition Lq(m).
We can think of the first three lines of (7) as the gains attained from the
information provided by a marginal increase in the probability of audit. The
fourth line contains the marginal resource cost, plus Kuhn-Tucker multipli-
ers associated with the upper and lower bounds on the audit probability.
Here it is important that audits are imperfect, which by Corollary 1 en-
sures that the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, and µ > 0, re-
gardless of q(m). Were audits perfect, sufficiently high audit probabilities
would result in slackness in the incentive compatibility constraint (µ = 0),
leaving the first order conditions for x(σ, θ), x(∅, θ) equated.
Consider the allocation xˆ(σ, θ) = xˆ(σ¯, θ) = x(∅, θ). This allocation
would leave the sum of the first three lines of (7) equal to zero. But this al-
location is not a stationary point of Lq(m), and does not satisfy the first order
necessary conditions for x(σ, θ), x(σ¯, θ) (equations 6c and 6d respectively).
We can do better by decreasing x(σ¯, θ), which has a low weight in ex-
pected welfare and a high weight in the incentive compatibility constraint,
and increasing x(σ, θ), which has a relatively high weight in expected wel-
fare and a low weight in the incentive compatibility constraint. This pertur-
bation would leave the sum of the first three lines of (7) strictly greater than
zero, such that for sufficiently low audit costs κ, additional audits would
always be welfare enhancing.
Theorem 2 shows that standard debt can be efficient under imperfect au-
dits. The remainder of this section explores the global efficiency of standard
debt, and the quantitative relevance. As we will see, an important determi-
nant of the efficiency of standard debt will be whether the entrepreneur has
access to a leverage margin—enabling them to scale up and down the size
of the project ex ante.
Under perfect audits, proposition 2 showed that when audit costs are
low, constant technological returns to scale would result in unbounded lever-
age and entrepreneurial consumption. When type-I audit errors occur with
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positive probability, that result no longer holds. To see this, note that the
incentive compatibility constraint (3) ensures that for some σ ∈ {∅, σ, σ¯},
x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) − x(m,σ, θ) ≥ (α + b)(θ¯ − θ). Combining this with assump-
tion 2 ensures that as b increases, consumption risk must be increasing and
consumption in some state x(m,σ, θ) must tend toward zero.
Entrepreneurs will not choose contracts with consumption bundles too
close to zero, where their marginal utility of consumption tends to infinity.
Entrepreneurs’ aversion to low consumption bundles in bad states encour-
ages them to choose contracts with limited leverage, even when their project
enjoys constant technological returns to scale. This argument is formalised
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When type-I errors occur with positive probability (η(θ) >
0), positive entrepreneurial consumption in all states requires that high type
consumption, leverage and the probability of audit satisfy the following in-
equalities
a. high type consumption, x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) > (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ),
b. leverage, α+ b
α
<
ρ
ρ− θ + piqκ , and
c. the probability of audit, q < min
(
1,
1
piκ
αρ
α+ b
[
1− α+ b
α
· ρ− θ
ρ
])
.
Proof. The first part of the proposition is a direct weakening of equation 3,
which is presented in a form such that all consumption bundles contained in
the constraint are earned with positive unconditional probability in contracts
with auditing, and are therefore positive by the assumption specified in the
proposition.
x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) > (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ) (8)
Substituting equation 8 and the budget constraints (1) into the participa-
tion constraint (4) with the assumption that entrepreneurial consumption is
positive in every state yields the following inequality:
(α+ b)(p¯iθ¯ + piθ − ρ− piqκ) + αρ > p¯i(α+ b)(θ¯ − θ) (9)
which can be rearranged to confirm parts (b) and (c) of the proposition.
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We proceed allowing borrowing b to be chosen freely, under the assump-
tion of constant technological returns to scale. This does not mean that firms
enjoy constant returns to scale. Firm size is endogenously bounded above
according to proposition 3. It does mean that the only source of decreasing
returns to scale is the information asymmetry between the entrepreneur and
external finance providers.
Figure 1 presents evidence of the quantitative relevance of standard debt
in our framework for a sample parameterisation. Along the horizontal axis,
the risk of the entrepreneur’s project (θ¯− θ) is increasing, holding expected
returns (E(θ)) constant. The vertical axis plots audit costs as a share of total
assets under management. Two features of the simulation are striking: First,
standard debt (q∗ = 1) is very prevalent. Very low project risk or high au-
dit costs are required for standard debt to be inefficient. Second, stochastic
audit regimes (0 < q∗ < 1) are rare. Indeed, when risk is low, efficient con-
tracts ‘jump’ from standard debt (q∗ = 1) to non-contingent debt contracts
(q∗ = 0). In the model, there is no cost associated with writing a ‘complex’
contract with stochastic audit regimes, as are optimal under the perfect au-
dits framework. Yet, entrepreneurs tend to prefer ‘simple’, non-contingent
or standard debt contracts.
When contracts are constrained by the upper and lower bound on audits
(q∗ = 0 or 1), local analysis of the entrepreneur’s problem is relatively
straightforward, yielding closed form solutions under constant relative risk
aversion when the likelihood of type-II audit error is zero (η(θ¯) = 0):9
Proposition 4 When the likelihood of type-I and type-II errors are positive
and zero respectively (η(θ) > 0, η(θ¯) = 0) and preferences exhibit constant
relative risk aversion U(x) = x1−γ/(1 − γ), leverage, consumption allo-
cations and shadow prices of standard debt contracts and non-contingent
debt contracts can be represented by closed-form expressions in terms of
exogenous parameters.
9Type-II errors, while perhaps more familiar than type-I errors, have little effect on the
nature of efficient contracts if they occur with a low probability. The implications of type-II
errors are investigated in appendix D.
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The proof of proposition 4 is given in appendix B. Displayed below
are solutions to standard debt contracts under logarithmic utility (U(x) =
log x).
x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) = αρ 1
1− ζ , x(m,σ, θ) = αρ, x(m, σ¯, θ) = αρ
piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
,
b =
αρ
θ¯ − θ
ζ
1− ζ
(
p¯i + piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
)
− α, where ζ = E(θ)− ρ− piκ
p¯i(θ¯ − θ) . (10)
From the solutions presented in (10), we can derive measures of leverage
and loan coupon rates, which are more easily observed than entrepreneurs’
consumption allocations in practise. Leverage, l, as measured by the to-
tal assets managed by the entrepreneur over their initial net worth can be
described as follows:
l =
α+ b
α
=
ρ
θ¯ − θ
ζ
1− ζ
(
p¯i + piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
)
. (11)
We can determine the net interest (coupon) rate on loans, r, by subtract-
ing one from the ratio of the repayment following high reports z(m¯, ∅) and
the initial amount borrowed b. Combining the budget constraints with (10)
yields
r =
z(m¯, ∅)
b
− 1 = (ρ− 1) + ρζ (θ¯ − ρ)(p¯i + piη(θ))− (θ¯ − θ)(p¯iζ + piη(θ))
ρζ(p¯i + piη(θ))− (1− ζ)(θ¯ − θ)(p¯iζ + piη(θ)) . (12)
The first term on the right hand side, (ρ−1), is the opportunity cost of funds
for the financial intermediary, expressed as a net interest rate. The second
term captures the interest rate credit spread, as measured by the difference
between the loan interest (coupon) rate and the financial intermediary’s op-
portunity cost of funds. Section 6 presents example comparative statics for
leverage ratios and the loan interest rate.
The solutions obtained by proposition 4 are local, though the entrepreneur’s
problem exhibits ‘jumps’ between locally efficient contracts. Fact 1 states
that for a standard debt contract to be globally efficient, it must be both
locally efficient, and superior to any non-contingent contract. While these
two necessary conditions do not rule out an alternative globally efficient
contract, we have not been able to find a numerical example where the two
necessary conditions expressed in fact 1 are satisfied, and standard debt con-
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tracts are not globally efficient.
Fact 1 Let Γ be a globally efficient contract, and q(Γ) = 1. (a) The Kuhn-
Tucker multiplier on the constraint q ≤ 1 must be positive (ν1 > 0), and (b)
expected utility under Γ must exceed the maximum utility attainable condi-
tional upon private information (E(U |Γ) ≥ E(U |(Γ∗|q = 0))).
When utility is CRRA and type-II errors do not occur (η(θ¯) = 0), then
by proposition 4 we can check fact 1 part (b) directly from the closed-
form solutions to standard and non-contingent debt contracts provided in
appendix B. When utility is logarithmic, we can also directly check fact 1
part (a) by the following result:
Proposition 5 When utility is logarithmic, and type-II errors do not occur
(η(θ¯) = 0), the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers on the upper and lower bounds
for the audit probability, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, can be described by closed-form
expressions.
A derivation of proposition 5 is provided in Appendix B.3.
We now return to reconsider the bang-bang feature of efficient contracts
observed in figure 1, which we formalise by proposition 6.
Proposition 6 When audits are imperfect, there exist parameter specifica-
tions which permit both non-contingent (q = 0) and standard (q = 1) debt
contracts as locally efficient contracts.
When project risk and audit costs are low, efficient contracts appear to
jump from non-contingent debt to standard debt. Figure 2 plots an exam-
ple of this bang-bang behaviour. In figure 2, the determination of efficient
contracts is deconstructed by leverage and audit strategy for one example
parameter specification. The horizontal axis plots levels of borrowing. The
lower panel plots the efficient probability of audit, conditional upon borrow-
ing, and the upper panel plots the attainable expected welfare conditional
upon borrowing. The solid line plots expected welfare attainable with a
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non-contingent contract (q = 0), the dashed line allows the audit strategy to
be chosen optimally.
The efficiency of standard debt is sensitive to the assumption that the
entrepreneur can determine the scale of the project. When leverage is low,
total risk is low, and the gains from insurance provided by auditing are low.
On the other hand, when leverage is high, proposition 3 showed that auditing
will push the minimum consumption allocation closer to zero. Audits are
only useful to the extent that the entrepreneur can absorb type-I errors in
low states.
Appendix C solves an example where non-contingent and standard debt
contracts are locally efficient. Under the non-contingent debt contract, the
marginal resource cost of additional audits exceeds the gains obtained from
the audit signal. Under the standard debt contract, the marginal resource
gain from reducing the audit probability is smaller than the cost of foregoing
the information and incentive gains obtained via the marginal audit.
Leverage is higher under the non-contingent contract than under the ef-
ficient standard debt contract, and therefore the marginal resource cost of
audits is higher than under the standard debt contract. The marginal benefit
from information obtained in additional audits is actually identical under the
two locally efficient contracts considered. Under the non-contingent con-
tract, the difference in expected marginal utility across project outcomes is
high, suggesting that the gains from insurance should be higher than under
the efficient standard debt contract. However, low consumption of low type
entrepreneurs also makes type-I errors particularly costly, preventing signif-
icant penalties in auditing contracts, and reducing the benefits obtained by
auditing.
6 COMPARATIVE STATICS
The preceding paragraphs explained how small parameter changes—for ex-
ample a small increase in project risk—can cause the efficient contract to
jump from a high leverage, low risk premium, non-contingent contract, to a
low leverage, high risk premium and highly contingent standard debt con-
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tract.
Within parameter neighbourhoods where defautable debt contracts are
efficient, we can use the solutions obtained in appendix B to analyse lo-
cal perturbations to expected returns, risk, audit costs and audit quality.
Consider the following parameterisation: The probability of default is pi =
1/10; conditional upon realisation of the low state, the audit signal returns a
high state with vanishing probability η(θ)→ 0+; the gross opportunity cost
of funds ρ = 21/20, equivalent to a 5% interest rate; the expected gross re-
turn on projects E(θ) = 6/5; the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ = 1;
audit costs as a share of the initial assets devoted to the project are κ = 9/80,
and in low states, the project returns θ = 33/40. Subsequently, the high type
return is θ¯ = 1
p¯i
[E(θ)− piθ] = 149/120; project risk is (θ¯ − θ) = 5/12; and
ζ = [E(θ)− ρ− piκ]/[p¯i(θ¯ − θ)] = 37/100.
By equation 11, leverage (l) is equal to
l =
ρ
θ¯ − θ
ζ
1− ζ
(
p¯i + piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
)
= 4.
By equation 12, the loan interest (coupon) rate is
r = (ρ− 1) + ρζ (E(θ) + pi(θ¯ − θ)− ρ)(p¯i + piη(θ))− (θ¯ − θ)(p¯iζ + piη(θ))
ρζ(p¯i + piη(θ))− (1− ζ)(θ¯ − θ)(p¯iζ + piη(θ)) = 10%,
We can take derivatives of the log of the leverage ratio to find the semi-
elasticities of leverage with respect to expected returns, the intermediary’s
opportunity cost, risk, audit costs and type-I errors:
d log l
d(E(θ))
= 4.23,
d log l
dρ
= −3.28, d log l
d(θ¯ − θ) = −3.81,
d log l
dκ
= −0.423 and d log l
dη(θ)
= −0.189
respectively, reported to 3 significant figures.10
We can also determine the sensitivity of efficient loan interest rates to
10For example, an increase in expected returns by 0.01 causes an increase in the optimal
leverage ratio by 4.23 percent. Note that rather than reporting semi-elasticities for returns
in each state (θ¯, θ), we have reported responses to expected returns E(θ) and risk (θ¯ − θ),
which we find to be more useful for intuition.
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underlying parameters:
dr
d(E(θ))
= −0.219, dr
dρ
= 1.20,
dr
d(θ¯ − θ) = 0.197,
dr
dκ
= 0.155 and
dr
dη(θ)
= −0.0357.
Whilst these calculations are specific to our example, they do provide in-
sights into the tradeoffs more generally faced by entrepreneurs.
An increase in expected project returns E(θ) increases leverage and, per-
haps surprisingly, decreases loan interest rates. The prospect of higher re-
turns encourages entrepreneurs to increase leverage, but they are limited in
doing so due to the presence of type-I errors. A decrease in interest pay-
ments in high states r leaves the entrepreneur enough funds in low states to
repay loans in full following type-I errors. In order to satisfy the financial
intermediary’s participation constraint, providing an expected return of ρ on
loans b net of auditing costs, the entrepreneur must absorb more project risk.
Low state repayments following verified reports (z(m,σ)/b) are increased.
Decreases in project risk (θ¯− θ) and audit costs (κ) have a similar effect on
leverage and interest rates as increases in expected returns E(θ).
Following a decrease in the financial intermediary’s opportunity cost of
funds, loan interest rates fall by an even greater amount. In other words,
the spread between loan interest rates and the opportunity cost of funds
is increasing in the opportunity cost of funds. First, a decrease in ρ al-
lows the entrepreneur to make lower repayments in all states, while meeting
the intermediary’s participation constraint. Second, when ρ is low, the en-
trepreneur enjoys more of the gains from increased leverage. As in the case
of an increase in expected returns E(θ), increases in leverage require the
entrepreneur to further lower interest repayments such that full repayments
are possible even following type-I errors. To compensate, repayments fol-
lowing verified low reports (z(m,σ)/b) must increase.
The only variable which moves leverage and loan interest rates in the
same direction is audit quality, as measured by the conditional probability
of type-I error (η(θ)). An increase in the probability of error encourages
entrepreneurs to increase consumption in the unlikely event of a type-I error.
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This adjustment is achieved first by decreasing leverage, which at any given
interest rate increases the amount of resources remaining following type-I
errors, and secondly by decreasing the loan interest rate r, which further
reduces repayments following type-I errors. This adjustment requires an
increase in repayments in low states (z(m,σ)/b) to compensate the financial
intermediary.
7 A FOUR-STATE EXAMPLE
In this section we extend the model by increasing the number of states from
two to four. Unfortunately, that makes the model analytically intractable.11
The purpose of this extension is twofold. First, it is clearly of interest to
investigate how general our analytical results are likely to be, concerning the
desirability of standard debt. Second, and related, it is of interest to compare
the imperfect audits case to that of the perfect audits case of Mookherjee and
Png (1989).
Typically, standard debt is defined as a contract where reports below
some cutoff are audited with certainty. See, for example Townsend (1979).
Audits above the cutoff are not audited. Thus, we state:
Definition 8 In a model with n > 2 possible states (θ ∈ (θ1, θ2, ..., θn) and
θi < θi+1), a contract is a standard debt contract if and only if
∃K ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} s.t. q(mj) = 1 ∀j < K, q(mj) = 0 otherwise. (13)
Note that incentive compatibility requires that all repayments following
reports above the cutoff must be identical
z(mi, ∅) = z(mj , ∅) ∀i, j ≥ K. (14)
Definition 8 generalises definition 3(b) used to analyse the two-state model
in earlier sections. An important feature of standard debt is that when in-
come is sufficiently high, repayments are not sensitive to income—the bor-
11Even with just four states, the problem contains 24 choice variables. We have been
unable to find superior contracts to the examples presented below, but we do not prove that
the contracts presented are globally efficient.
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rower need not ever pay more than the coupon plus the principal. This is
formalised in equation 14, and is not observable in the two-state model,
where there is only one ‘high’ state. In this section with a multiple states
model it turns out that imperfect audits do indeed motivate that feature of
standard debt.
Figure 3 presents a numerically-solved example of locally efficient con-
tracts under perfect and imperfect audits. In order to compare the incen-
tive regimes under the two environments, borrowing b is set exogenously.
The upper panel presents the probability distribution from which states are
drawn. The second panel presents the expected repayment conditional upon
the true state being equal to θ. The contract with signal errors (marked by×)
features constant repayments across the three higher states, and a reduced
expected repayment in the lowest state. The perfect audits contract (marked
by +) exhibits sharply increasing repayments across states—similar to an
equity contract with variable dividends. The third panel presents the ex-
pected utility of the borrower, conditional upon the realised state. The
contract with signal errors exhibits significant sensitivity between expected
utility and project outcomes, across all states. The contract with perfect
audits exhibits increasing expected utility across states, although the sen-
sitivity of utility across states is very low. The fourth panel presents the
auditing regime under each contract. The contract with signal errors resem-
bles a standard debt contract: reports of the lowest state are followed by
certain audits (q(m1) = 1). Reports of any higher states are not audited
(q(m2) = q(m3) = q(m4) = 0). Under perfect audits, audits are conducted
with low probability across all of the three lower states.
8 DISCUSSION
Standard debt contracts can be the optimal form of external finance contracts
when contract enforcement is uncertain due to noisy audit signals. Support-
ing truth-telling under a stochastic audit strategies requires large penalties.
When there is no guarantee that these penalties are fairly applied, these
contracts will not be acceptable to risk averse entrepreneurs. The resulting
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efficient contracts will audit consequent only on low reports, but will likely
audit low reports with certainty. As a result, only small penalties are re-
quired to ensure truth-telling in equilibrium. In fact, the penalty following
a disputed report in an optimal debt contract is typically very close to fully
repaying the debt.
Imperfect verification also implies other interesting properties of opti-
mal contracts. For instance, it means that borrowers can only pass a lim-
ited amount of risk on to lenders, regardless of contracted audit strategies.
And even when projects enjoy constant returns to scale and audits are rel-
atively inexpensive, firm size and leverage is endogenously limited by the
entrepreneur’s risk preference.
We end with a final observation. The standard debt contracts derived un-
der imperfect monitoring enjoy an additional benefit—one that we did not
formalise. When enforcement is certain, or near certain, incentive compati-
bility is not sensitive to the risk tolerance of the entrepreneur. That reduces
the potential for adverse selection in two forms: First, the preferences of
the entrepreneur may be unobservable; and second, the entrepreneur may
have access to hidden wealth. The presence of either of these sources of
asymmetric information would make it more difficult to employ a stochas-
tic incentive scheme.
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A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof.
2. It is established that if it were the case that low type agents were
indifferent to reporting high or low type messages, then the contract
in place must be weakly inferior than a simple non-contingent debt
contract. This argument is made via three perturbations which leave
the expected utility of the entrepreneur either unchanged or increased,
and relax the intermediary’s participation constraint.
Let the probability of audit following high type reports be positive,
and the incentive compatibility constraint be binding for low type en-
trepreneurs: q(m¯) > 0 and∑
σ∈Θ∪∅
∆(σ(θ, q(m)))U [(α+ b)θ − z(m,σ(θ, q(m)))]
=
∑
σ∈Θ∪∅
∆(σ(θ, q(m¯)))U [(α+ b)θ − z(m¯, σ(θ, q(m¯)))]. (15)
Perturbation 1: First replace all z(m¯;σ) with z′(m¯), such that∑
σ∈Θ∪∅
∆(σ(θ¯, q(m¯)))U [(α+ b)θ¯ − z(m¯, σ(θ¯, q(m¯)))] = U [(α+ b)θ¯ − z′(m¯)].
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The perturbation leaves truth-telling high type entrepreneurs indiffer-
ent. By Jensen’s inequality, that perturbation will relax the intermedi-
ary’s participation constraint, but could possibly violate the incentive
compatibility constraint (15). If (15) is now not violated, then the
proof is complete, and q(m¯) can be set to zero, as the information
yielded by auditing high type messages is ignored.
If (15) is violated after the perturbation, then
U [(α+ b)θ − z′(m¯)] >
∑
σ∈Θ∪∅
∆(σ(θ, q(m)))U [(α+ b)θ − z(m,σ(θ, q(m)))].
Perturbation 2: Now replace z(m,σ) with z′(m), such that
U [(α+ b)θ − z′(m)] =
∑
σ∈Θ∪∅
∆(σ(θ, q(m)))U [(α+ b)θ − z(m,σ(θ, q(m))).
By Jensen’s inequality, that perturbation would also relax the partic-
ipation constraint. Given that (15) is violated, z′(m) > z′(m¯): Low
type entrepreneurs have an incentive to report high type shocks.
Perturbation 3: Replace z′(m), z′(m¯) with z′′ = piz′(m) + p¯iz′(m¯)
Perturbation 3 restores incentive compatibility, by equating repay-
ments across reports and states. The participation constraint is re-
spected, as expected repayments are unchanged. The new contract
offers expected utility which is strictly greater than under the original
contract, by Jensen’s inequality:
p¯iU [(α+b)θ¯−z′′]+piU [(α+b)θ−z′′] > p¯iU [(α+b)θ¯−z′(m¯)]+piU [(α+b)θ−z′(m)].
Audits are not required, as repayments are non-contingent.
3(a). For the incentive compatibility constraint ( 2 ; θ = θ¯) to be satis-
fied, there must be some consumption bundle x(m,σ, θ) < x(m¯, ∅, θ¯),
where σ ∈ {∅, σ¯, σ}, and x(m,σ, θ) is a bundle consumed with non-
zero unconditional probability (∆(σ|m, q(m)) > 0). Let equation ( 2
; θ = θ¯) be slack. There must be some ε ∈ (0,∞) such that a pertur-
bation increasing z(m¯, ∅) by ε
∆(∅|m¯, 0) , and decreasing z(m,σ) by
ε
∆(σ|m, q(m)) , which would violate neither the participation nor the
29
incentive compatibility constraints. This perturbation would increase
expected utility by Jensen’s inequality.
3(b). When audits are perfect, we cannot directly follow the proof of part
3(a)—the incentive compatibility constraint does not directly ensure
that consumption x varies across states. First, if x does vary across
states and audit signals, then we can follow the same argument as in
part 3(a), and perturb toward a contract with less consumption vari-
ability. If x is constant across all states, then we could reduce the
audit probability q, relaxing the participation constraint without vio-
lating the incentive compatibility constraint.
B EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS UNDER NON-CONTINGENT
AND STANDARD DEBT CONTRACTS
Here we solve for efficient allocations and borrowing when efficient audit
strategies are deterministic, ie. when q = 0 or 1. Here, we assume CRRA
utility, U(x) = x1−γ/(1−γ). In the text, we refer to the more tractable case
of logarithmic utility, which can be found by setting γ = 1 in any of the
solutions contained in this section.
The general problem outlined by equation 6 is non-convex, due to the
presence of the lottery in the right hand side of the incentive compatibility
constraint. When the probability of audit q(m) is constrained by either its
upper or lower bound, ν0 or ν1 > 0, and the probability of type-II audit
errors is zero η(θ¯) = 0, then locally the problem is convex, and we can use
the first order approach to find local maxima.
B.1 PRIVATE INFORMATION CONTRACTS (q = 0)
When audits are not used (q = 0), efficient contracts are non-contingent.
Repayments are independent of entrepreneurs’ reports, and no audit signals
are obtained to condition repayments. This certainty of repayment makes
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the incentive compatibility constraint linear in the choice variables, enabling
us to solve the entrepreneur’s problem with a Lagrangian:
L0 = p¯i U(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯)) + pi U(x(m, ∅, θ))
+ λ[(α+ b)(E(θ)− ρ) + αρ− p¯ix(m¯, ∅, θ¯)− pix(m, ∅, θ)]
+ µ
[
U(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯))− U [x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]] . (16)
The first order conditions are
x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) : 0 = p¯iU ′(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯))− p¯iλ+ µ U ′(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯))
x(m, ∅, θ) : 0 = piU ′(x(m, ∅, θ))− piλ− µ U ′[x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]
b : 0 = λ(E(θ)− ρ)− µ(θ¯ − θ)U ′[x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)].
Substituting the incentive compatibility constraint and utility function into
the first order conditions yields
U ′(x(m, ∅, θ))
U ′(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯)) =
p¯i
pi
(
θ¯ − ρ
ρ− θ
)
. (17)
The right hand side of equation 17 shows that the ratio of weighted returns
in high and low states can be interpreted as the cost of consumption in low
states relative to consumption in high states. Equation 17 along with the
incentive compatibility constraint can be substituted into the participation
constraint to solve first for x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) and the remaining choice variables:
x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) = αρ (θ¯ − θ)(
pi(ρ− θ)
p¯i(θ¯ − ρ)
)1/γ
(θ¯ − ρ) + (ρ− θ)
x(m, ∅, θ) = αρ (θ¯ − θ)
(θ¯ − ρ) + (ρ− θ)
(
p¯i(θ¯ − ρ)
pi(ρ− θ)
)1/γ
b = αρ

1−
(
pi(ρ− θ)
p¯i(θ¯ − ρ)
)1/γ
(
pi(ρ− θ)
p¯i(θ¯ − ρ)
)1/γ
(θ¯ − ρ) + (ρ− θ)
− α
λ =
[
pi1/γ(θ¯ − ρ) γ−1γ + p¯i1/γ(ρ− θ) γ−1γ
αρ (θ¯ − θ) γ−1γ
]γ
µ =
p¯i(E(θ)− ρ)
ρ− θ . (18)
31
B.2 ALWAYS AUDIT CONTRACTS (q = 1) WITH NO TYPE-
II ERRORS (η(θ¯) = 0)
When audits occur with certainty following low type reports, and the audit
signal correctly identifies high type entrepreneurs with certainty, then as in
the private information case the incentive compatibility constraint becomes
linear. Our problem can be expressed by the following Lagrangian
L1 = p¯i U(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯)) + pi(1− η(θ)) U(x(m,σ, θ)) + piη(θ) U(x(m, σ¯, θ))
+ λ[(α+ b)(E(θ)− ρ− piκ) + αρ− p¯ix(m¯, ∅, θ¯)− pi(1− η(θ))x(m,σ, θ)− piη(θ)x(m, σ¯, θ)]
+ µ
[
U(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯))− U [x(m, σ¯, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]] (19)
The first order conditions are
x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) : 0 = p¯iU ′(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯))− p¯iλ+ µ U ′(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯))
x(m,σ, θ) : 0 = pi(1− η(θ))U ′(x(m,σ, θ))− pi(1− η(θ))λ
x(m, σ¯, θ) : 0 = piη(θ)U ′(x(m, σ¯, θ))− piη(θ)λ− µ U ′[x(m, σ¯, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]
b : 0 = λ(E(θ)− ρ− piκ)− µ(θ¯ − θ)U ′[x(m, σ¯, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)].
Substituting the incentive compatibility constraint into the first order con-
ditions yields
U ′(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯)) = λ
(
p¯i(θ¯ − θ)− (E(θ)− ρ− piκ)
p¯i(θ¯ − θ)
)
U ′(x(m,σ, θ)) = λ
U ′(x(m, σ¯, θ)) = λ
(
piη(θ)(θ¯ − θ) + E(θ)− ρ− piκ
piη(θ)(θ¯ − θ)
)
,
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which we can combine with the intermediary’s participation constraint and
the utility function and solve for consumption allocations:
x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) = αρχ
(
1
1− ζ
)1/γ
x(m,σ, θ) = αρχ
x(m, σ¯, θ) = αρχ
(
piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
)1/γ
b =
αρχ
θ¯ − θ
(
ζ
1− ζ
)1/γ (
p¯i + piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
)1/γ
− α
λ = (αρχ)−γ
µ =
p¯iζ
1− ζ . (20)
where
χ =
1
p¯i (1− ζ) γ−1γ + piη(θ)
(
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
piη(θ)
) γ−1
γ
+ pi(1− η(θ))
, and
ζ =
E(θ)− ρ− piκ
p¯i(θ¯ − θ) .
B.3 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Proof. We can write the first order condition for q as follows:
Lq = (1− η(θ))U(x(m,σ, θ)) + η(θ)U(x(m, σ¯, θ))− U(x(m, ∅, θ))
− λ[(α+ b)piκ+ (1− η(θ))x(m,σ, θ) + η(θ)x(m, σ¯, θ)− x(m, ∅, θ)]
+ µ[U(x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ))− U(x(m, σ¯, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ))] + ν0 − ν1.
(21)
In order to solve for Kuhn-Tucker multiplier ν1, we need to solve for
shadow allocations which are consumed with probability zero: x(m, ∅, θ)
in the case of standard debt.
In the limit as q → 1−, the first order condition for x(m, ∅, θ) must hold,
even though this allocation is consumed with vanishing probability. The
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first order condition for x(m, ∅, θ) is:
x(m, ∅, θ) : 0 = piU ′(x(m, ∅, θ))− piλ− µ U ′[x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)].
Under logarithmic utility, U ′(x) = 1/x. We can solve for x(m, ∅, θ) using
the solutions obtained in (20):
x(m, ∅, θ) = −αρ
2
[
1
pi
ζ
1− ζ −
piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
]
+
αρ
2
√[
1
pi
ζ
1− ζ −
piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
]2
+ 4
ζ
1− ζ
(
p¯i + piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
)
. (22)
Noting that ν0 = 0 by complimentary slackness, substitute (22) and (20)
into (21) to express the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier ν1 as a closed-form expres-
sion in terms of parameters.
C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Proof. Consider the case where the entrepreneur enjoys consumption with
log utility, type–II errors occur with zero probability (η(θ¯) = 0) and type-I
errors occur with positive but very low probability, η(θ)→ 0+. By proposi-
tion 4, consumption following overturned low type reports also tends toward
zero (limη(θ)→0+ x(m, σ¯, θ) = 0), and by l’Hoˆpital’s rule, the contribution
to ex ante expected utility of the entrepreneur from consumption following
overturned reports also tends toward zero, (limη(θ)→0+ piη(θ)U(x(m, σ¯, θ)) =
0). When type-I errors are extremely rare, errors have little effect on the ex
ante welfare of entrepreneurs but still limit repayments drawn from high
type entrepreneurs.
For tractability, we consider contracts under the following assumptions:
First, type-I errors will occur with very low (positive) probability. Second,
utility will be logarithmic over consumption. Third, the two income states
will occur with equal probability.
Let y1 (y0) be the efficient value of choice variable y in the always audit
(private information) contract. Substituting U(x) = log x and pi = p¯i = 1/2
into the solutions from Appendix B, and taking the limit as η(θ) → 0+, we
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obtain the following solutions:
α+ b1
α
=
1
2
ρ
ρ− θ + piκ, x1(m¯, ∅, θ¯) = αρ
1
2
θ¯ − θ
ρ− θ + piκ, x1(m,σ, θ) = αρ
x1(m, ∅, θ) = αρ
−(E(θ)− ρ− piκ) +
√
(E(θ)− ρ− piκ)2 + 1
2
(θ¯ − θ)(ρ− θ + piκ)
ρ− θ + piκ
x1(m, σ¯, θ) = 0, λ1 =
1
αρ
, µ1 =
1
2
E(θ)− ρ− piκ
ρ− θ + piκ . (23)
α+ b0
α
=
ρ(E(θ)− ρ)
(θ¯ − ρ)(ρ− θ) , x0(m¯; ∅; θ¯) = αρ
1
2
θ¯ − θ
ρ− θ , x0(m,σ, θ) = αρ
x0(m, ∅, θ) = αρ 1
2
θ¯ − θ
θ¯ − ρ , x0(m, σ¯, θ) = 0, λ0 =
1
αρ
, µ0 =
1
2
E(θ)− ρ
ρ− θ .
(24)
The bang-bang result occurs when efficient contracts ‘jump’ between pri-
vate information and standard debt contracts, where both are local max-
ima. To focus on these bang-bang results, we first set κ such that the al-
ways audit and private information contracts provide equal expected utility
(EU(x1) = EU(x0)). Solving for κ yields
piκ = 2
(ρ− θ)(E(θ)− ρ)
θ¯ − θ (25)
It is useful to define two new parameters, one representing the excess return
in good states and the other the shortfall in bad states. Thus, let φ¯, φ ∈ R+,
where φ¯ = θ¯ − ρ, and φ = ρ − θ. All else equal, the entrepreneur would
prefer a project with large φ¯, and small φ. Note that assumptions 1 and 2
require that φ ∈ (0, φ¯). Substituting equation 25 into the solutions for the
always standard debt contract (23), we can re-write allocations as follows:
b1 =
αρ
4
:
φ¯+ φ
φ¯φ
− α, x1(m¯, ∅, θ¯) = αρ
4
(φ¯+ φ)2
φ¯φ
,
x1(m, ∅, θ) = αρ
4
−(φ¯− φ)2 +
√
(φ¯− φ)4 + 4φ¯φ(φ¯+ φ)2
φ¯φ
 , µ1 = 1
8
(φ¯− φ)2
φ¯φ
(26)
Now, consider the trade-off characterised by the first order condition for
auditing q at the always audit contract. After substituting equations 25 and
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26 into the first order condition for q (equation 21), we obtain
Lq = 1
2
log
 4φ¯φ
−(φ¯− φ)2 +
√
(φ¯− φ)4 + 4φ¯φ(φ¯+ φ)2

− 1
2
1− −(φ¯− φ)2 +
√
(φ¯− φ)4 + 4φ¯φ(φ¯+ φ)2
4φ¯φ
− 1
4
(φ¯− φ)
φ¯
+
1
8
(φ¯− φ)2
φ¯φ
log
1 + −(φ¯− φ)2 +
√
(φ¯− φ)4 + 4φ¯φ(φ¯+ φ)2
(φ¯+ φ)2
− ν1.
(27)
The first term on the right hand side of equation 27 is the welfare gain
attained through auditing by verifying low type agents’ reports. In this ex-
ample, agents clearly prefer to be audited, x(m,σ, θ) > x(m, ∅, θ) for all
values of φ¯, φ. The second term captures the resource cost of this increase
in consumption for low type agents whose reports are verified, and the third
term represents the extra resource costs expended by the intermediary in
conducting more audits. The fourth term captures welfare gains attained
by relaxing the incentive compatibility constraint: auditing with a higher
probability directly increases the likelihood that misreporting high type en-
trepreneurs will be punished. The final term on the right hand side is the
Lagrange multiplier capturing the shadow cost of the natural upper bound
of one attached to the audit probability.
Let φ→ 0+. By l’Hoˆpital’s rule,
lim
φ→0+
−(φ¯− φ)2 +
√
(φ¯− φ)4 + 4φ¯φ(φ¯+ φ)2
4φ¯φ
=
1
2
, and
lim
φ→0+
1
φ
log
1 + −(φ¯− φ)2 +
√
(φ¯− φ)4 + 4φ¯φ(φ¯+ φ)2
(φ¯+ φ)2
 = 2
φ¯
.
Substituting these results into 27 while retaining the same ordering of terms
yields
lim
φ→0+
Lq(q = 1) = 1
2
log 2− 1
4
− 1
4
+
1
4
− ν1. (28)
The Kuhn-Tucker multiplier ν1 is positive. At the margin, the benefits
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of additional audits outweigh the costs. The first two terms show that the
utility benefits accruing to low type entrepreneurs from verification of their
reports exceeds the resource cost associated with awarding more low type
entrepreneurs with the post-verification consumption bundle. The resource
cost of audits is the product of the Lagrange multiplier on the resource con-
straint, total assets devoted to the project and audit costs. Here, as the down-
side shortfall φ approaches zero, borrowing and assets devoted to the project
are unbounded above. When downside risk is low, the benefits of auditing
are small, and indeed the audit cost which equates the expected welfare of
always audit and private information contracts is vanishing piκ → 0+. The
resource cost of the marginal audit is 1/4, which in this case is equal and
opposite to the benefit attained from the marginal audit by relaxing the in-
centive compatibility constraint.
For the same case, letting φ → 0+, now consider the corresponding
private information contract. The first order condition for q can be written
as follows:
Lq = 1
2
log
2φ¯
φ¯+ φ
− 1
2
[
1− 1
2
φ¯+ φ
φ¯
]
− 1
2
(φ¯− φ)2
φ¯(φ¯+ φ)
+
1
4
φ¯− φ
φ
log
(
φ
φ¯− φ + 1
)
+ ν0.
Taking the limit as φ→ 0+ yields
lim
φ→0+
Lq(q = 0) = 1
2
log 2− 1
4
− 1
2
+
1
4
+ ν0, (29)
The first term captures the direct welfare benefit from verifying entrepreneur
reports, and providing them with the consumption bundle x0(m,σ, θ) >
x0(m, ∅, θ). This benefit, and the resource cost associated with it and cap-
tured in the second term, are identical to those in the always audit contract
(28). This is due to the fact that these consumption bundles are identical
in both contracts for this limiting case: low type agents whose reports are
verified (x(m,σ, θ)) consume αρ and low type agents whose reports are
unverified (x(m, ∅, θ)) consume αρ/2 in both contracts. As in the always
audit contract (28), the fourth term capturing the relaxation in the incentive
compatibility constraint is equal to 1/4.
The third term, capturing the cost of the marginal audit, is greater in
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magnitude than under the always audit contract. Audit costs as a fraction of
assets employed in the project are constant across contracts by assumption,
yet leverage in the private information contract is greater than in the always
audit contract. We can see this by taking the limit of the ratio of assets
devoted to the project in the two contracts: limφ→0
α + b0
α + b1
= 2.
D STANDARD DEBT CONTRACTS WITH TYPE-
II ERRORS
Assume that the probability of Type-II errors η(θ¯) following the audit of
a high type entrepreneur is low, and that the optimal contract is standard
debt (q∗ = 1). We can find approximate closed form solutions to optimal
contracts using a first order Taylor expansion of the Incentive Compatibility
Constraint around η(θ¯) = 0. Denote the efficient contract at η(θ¯) = 0
with all other parameters constant by Γ0, with associated public actions and
allocations labelled b0, q0 = 1, x0, z0.
U(x0(m¯, ∅, θ¯)) ≥ U(x0(m, σ¯, θ¯)) + U ′(x0(m, σ¯, θ¯))[x(m, σ¯, θ¯)− x0(m, σ¯, θ¯)]
− U ′(x0(m¯, ∅, θ¯))[x(m¯, ∅, θ¯)− x0(m¯, ∅, θ¯)]
+ η(θ¯)[U(x0(m,σ, θ¯))− U(x0(m, σ¯, θ¯))]
Note that x0(m¯, ∅, θ¯) = x0(m, σ¯, θ¯), which combined with the budget con-
straints allows us to simplify the above expression as follows:
z(m, σ¯)− z(m¯, ∅) ≥ η(θ¯)
U ′(x0(m, σ¯, θ¯))
[U(x0(m,σ, θ¯))− U(x0(m, σ¯, θ¯))]. (30)
When utility is log, we can solve directly using Proposition 4. After re-
arranging and simplifying, our first order approximation of the ICC can be
written as a linear expression in terms of contracted repayments:
z(m, σ¯)− z(m¯, ∅) ≥ η(θ¯) αρ
1− ζ log
[
1 +
p¯iζ(1− p¯iζ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
]
(31)
This linear approximation to the ICC permits closed form approximations
to allocations and leverage for efficient contracts, which are not presented
here.
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One interpretation of equation 31 is that it specifies a a small non-
refundable fee paid by all entrepreneurs who declare a low type return.
Entrepreneurs whose reports are overturned by the audit signal would be
required to repay the full contracted repayment z(m¯, ∅) in addition to the
small fee. When η(θ¯) is small, this fee is negligible.
E Figures
Figure 1: Efficient contracts, project risk and audit costs. (U(x) = √x, ρ = 1,E(θ) =
1.2, p¯i = 0.9, η(θ) = 0.01).
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Figure 2: The determination of optimal contracts when there are multiple local maxima.
(U(x) = log x, ρ = 1,E(θ) = 1.2, p¯i = 0.9, (θ¯−θ) = 0.3, η(θ) = 10−4, α = 1, κ ≈ 0.18)
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Figure 3: A Four-state example. (Θ = (0.9, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2), pi(Θ) =
(1/8, 3/8, 3/8, 1/8), ρ = 1, α = 1, b = 5, κ = 0.08, U(x) = x1−γ/(1 − γ), γ = 9/10).
Imperfect audits case marked by ×, with P (σ = θi|θ = θj) = 10−|i−j| if and only if i 6=
j. Perfect audits case marked by +, with P (σ = θi|θ = θj) = 0 if and only if i 6= j.
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